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For a single tort case in which liability is no longer con-tested, Philip Morris USA  v. Williams1 proved remarkablydifficult to bring to closure.  Like many plaintiffs since the
1990s, Mayola Williams persuaded a jury that Philip Morris
fraudulently concealed the addictive and carcinogenic aspects
of its product from the public and thereby killed her husband.
The jury awarded $821,000 in compensatory damages and
$79.5 million in punitive damages.  That is a nearly 100:1
ratio, far greater than the single-digit ratio designated by the
Court as a presumptive limit only four years earlier in State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Campbell.2 It is
therefore unsurprising that, in 2007—eight years after the case
went to trial—the United States Supreme Court bridled at the
award in Williams and remanded it to the Oregon Supreme
Court to examine whether there had been a procedural due-
process violation in the trial judge’s handling of the case, espe-
cially its jury instructions.  It is equally unsurprising that the
Oregon Supreme Court, aiming to preserve the autonomy of its
tort law and hostile to a perceived pro-business orientation on
the Roberts Court, wished to keep the $79.5 million dollar ver-
dict intact and promptly reaffirmed the verdict.  The surprise
is that after three visits to the Court, plenty of hand-wringing,
and a volatile oral argument in December of 2008, the United
States Supreme Court simply backed down and permitted a
visibly defiant Oregon Supreme Court to have its way.  On
March 31, the Supreme Court issued a one-line per curiam
order dismissing the certiorari petition in Williams as improv-
idently granted. 3
What happened?  The short answer appears to be that the
United States Supreme Court, with Chief Justice Roberts
replacing Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Alito replacing
Justice O’Connor, has become queasy about doing constitu-
tional excessiveness review of the sort commenced in BMW v.
Gore. 4 Not only did the Supreme Court decline to cut the
damages award in Williams, it did not even address the size of
the award.  Indeed, in initially granting Philip Morris’s certio-
rari petition last year, the Court pointedly declined to hear
arguments on the size of the award.5 Oral argument in
Williams during the 2006 Term had little or nothing to do with
excessiveness, and even though the Court had granted certio-
rari on the BMW excessiveness issue in Williams, Justice Breyer
expressly declined to address that issue in his opinion.6 As the
recent 80% reduction of the Alaskan fisherman’s verdict in the
Exxon Valdez case indicates, a majority of the Court is willing
to cut a punitive-damages verdict,7 but that case was decided
on federal statutory grounds; the Court had pointedly declined
to grant certiorari on the constitutional excessiveness issue.8
The 2007 decision in Williams therefore appeared to represent
a decision to move in a new direction, but the Court was able
to do so only tentatively; moreover, the Court was unwilling to
bring Philip Morris relief because it was uncomfortable utiliz-
ing its most potent tool for punitive damages:  constitutional
excessiveness review. 
Why would the Roberts Court suddenly become dissatisfied
with BMW’s approach to punitive damages?  What is it about
the arrival of Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito that might
have precipitated this change?  While one can only conjecture,
certain conjectures are quite plausible.  Justice Scalia and
Justice Thomas have always rejected excessiveness review as
another example of substantive due process, which they reject
for both jurisprudential and ideological reasons, associating
BMW v. Gore with both Roe v. Wade9 and Lochner v. New York.10
If Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito shared the
Scalia/Thomas hostility to substantive due process and shared
their sense (and that of Justice Ginsburg) of the institutional
competence and federalist reasons against excessiveness
review, they would have ample reason to be uncomfortable
with BMW and its progeny.  Before pouring more into that
framework and even before tolerating it, the new Justices
would perhaps be attracted to the idea of a foundation that is
not so perilously close to sheer second-guessing of state court
judgments of what constitutes “too big.”  Chief Justice Roberts
and Justice Alito appear to have believed they could have it all
by switching to procedural due process, and their willingness
to sign onto Philip Morris’s victory in 2007 seems to reflect this
precise strategy.  
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This article is an exploration of the Court’s new direction in
Williams, written with the hope of providing guidance to the
courts now required to apply it.11 The constitutional doctrine
of punitive damages before Williams is briefly set forth in Part
I.  Part II recounts Justice Breyer’s majority opinion for the
Court, as well as the dissents filed by Justices Stevens, Thomas,
and Ginsburg, and closes with a short overview of the subse-
quent progress of the case.  Part III elaborates on the problems
of Williams—both those that arise from the opinion itself and
those that have arisen or are likely to arise for courts striving
to understand the case moving forward—and argues that the
problems stem from basic lack of clarity regarding the justifi-
cation for the treatment of nonparty harm.  Part IV sets forth a
theoretical model that makes sense of the nonparty-harm rule
and resolves the tensions within Williams.  In doing so, it
draws from my own prior work and sounds themes articulated
by scholars such as Thomas Colby and Dan Markel in recent
articles also addressing Williams.12 The clarifications of Part IV
guide a discussion in Part V of model jury instructions that
some jurisdictions have produced in light of Williams and in
Part VI of a variety of difficult issues that have confronted
courts in the aftermath of Williams.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL SCRUTINY OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
BEFORE WILLIAMS
The United States Supreme Court has issued exactly eight
significant decisions regarding the constitutional scrutiny of
punitive damages:  Browning-Ferris v. Kelco,13 Pacific Mut. Life
Ins. Co. v. Haslip,14 TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources
Corp.,15 Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg,16 BMW of North America,
Inc. v. Gore,17 Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group,
Inc.,18 State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Campbell,19 and Williams
itself.  While each could sustain (and has sustained) substan-
tial commentary, the doctrine itself remains quite straightfor-
ward.  In Browning-Ferris, a 7-2 majority held that the Eighth
Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause did not apply to punitive
damages.  The Court in Haslip and TXO held that the common-
law procedures associated with punitive damages were not per
se violations of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause but that at some point a grossly excessive punitive dam-
ages award might be so unreasonable as to violate the Due
Process Clause.  In neither case did the Court find the awards
grossly excessive. Honda v. Oberg, the least cited of the eight
decisions, held that a state
statute knocking out all
but the most minimal
appellate review of puni-
tive damages awards
departed from the 
common-law protections
afforded defendants and
therefore violated the Due
Process Clause.  Prior to
BMW v. Gore, the Court
had ruled out the Excessive
Fines Clause, had ruled out any broad due-process attack
based on inadequate state procedures, and had left open the
possibility of some enormous punitive damages award “cross-
ing the line” of what it considered constitutionally permissible.
BMW v. Gore, decided in 1996, remains the Court’s most
important punitive-damages decision because it is the first to
strike down a punitive-damages award as excessive and there-
fore unconstitutional.  Writing for a 5-4 majority, Justice
Stevens set out a three-guidepost test for determining whether
an award was grossly excessive.   Courts should consider the
reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct, the ratio of puni-
tive damages to the actual (or potential harm) suffered by the
plaintiff,  and the size of the award relative to sanctions pre-
scribed by civil or criminal statutes of the jurisdiction for com-
parable conduct.  Alabama’s Supreme Court had permitted the
plaintiff, Ira Gore, to recover a two-million-dollar punitive
damages award based on minimally reprehensible conduct of
BMW, namely, the failure to disclose that because of flaws in
the original paint job of his $40,000 BMW, the company had
repainted it before sale.  The economic damages associated
were $4,000, leaving a ratio of 500 to 1, and comparable sanc-
tions in Alabama were relatively puny.20 Justice Stevens easily
concluded that this was excessive and therefore a violation of
due process.  As a theoretical matter, he opined that fair notice
was a core value of the Due Process Clause and that grossly
excessive awards were inconsistent with this value.
Cooper v. Leatherman and State Farm v. Campbell put teeth
in the gross-excessiveness test of BMW.  An  8-1 majority held
in Cooper (per Justice Stevens) that appellate review of gross
excessiveness was to be de novo.21 A 6-3 majority held in State
Farm v. Campbell (per Justice Kennedy) that the ratio between
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punitive and compensatory
damages may not normally
exceed a single-digit ratio.22
State Farm also endorsed a
number of other propositions,
most notably:  that the defen-
dant’s wealth could not be
used to justify an otherwise
excessive award,23 that
although “[l]awful out-of-
state conduct may be proba-
tive when it demonstrates the
deliberateness and culpability of the defendant’s action in the
State where it is tortious, . . . the conduct must have a nexus to
the specific harm suffered by the plaintiff,”24 and that dissimi-
lar conduct could not be used to heighten the award.25
Several important themes have dominated the opinions of
those justices resisting constitutional scrutiny of punitive dam-
ages.  In Browning-Ferris, the Court reasoned that punitive
damages should not be regarded as a form of fine because the
state does not initiate tort suits and because it does not keep
the money.26 In that case and in the middle-of-the-road opin-
ion for the Court in Haslip (as well as the concurrences), a
majority of the Justices gave significant weight to the historical
pedigree of punitive damages within the common law.27
Justice Scalia’s powerful concurring opinion in Haslip declared
that the historical acceptance of punitive damages with
civil/tort-law safeguards by definition rules out any procedural
“due process” critique now.28 Justice Thomas has remained
true to that line;29 indeed, Justice Thomas recently authored a
5-4 opinion for the Court recognizing the presence and legiti-
macy of punitive damages in the common law of admiralty and
therefore permitting punitive damages in (at least a large sub-
set of) admiralty personal-injury cases.30 Both Justice Scalia
and Justice Thomas have also vigorously criticized Justice
Stevens and other members of the BMW majority for engaging
in the sort of substantive due process that made Lochner noto-
rious (and that, on their view, plagues the post-Griswold pri-
vacy decisions).31 Finally, Justice Ginsburg wrote an important
dissenting opinion in BMW (with which Chief Justice
Rehnquist concurred and whose thrust is shared by Scalia and
Thomas) emphasizing that federalist and institutional compe-
tence concerns should lead the Court to stay out of the puni-
tive-damages area where it does not belong.32
Conversely, two voices in favor of punitive damages
scrutiny before Williams did not write any majority opinions
on punitive damages but nevertheless contributed substan-
tially to the Court’s thought in this area.  From the outset,
Justice O’Connor strongly agreed with the defendants chal-
lenging contemporary punitive-damages awards, and her dis-
senting opinion in Browning-Ferris (with which Justice Stevens
concurred) favored use of the Excessive Fines Clause for what
she regarded as arbitrary and excessive state fines secured
through private plaintiffs.33 Again, in her dissent in Haslip,
Justice O’Connor made a forceful argument that punitive-dam-
ages law in Alabama was patently unacceptable as a procedural
due-process matter, whether one applied void-for-vagueness
standards or one applied Mathews v. Eldridge.34 Concern with
procedural due process and cabining jury discretion was at the
core of Justice Breyer’s important concurring opinion in BMW
v. Gore, with which Justice O’Connor and Justice Souter con-
curred.35 It is notable that the author of the opinion for the
Court in Williams was Justice Breyer—the leading voice of pro-
cedural due-process concerns in punitive-damages cases on
the Court since Justice O’Connor stepped down.
II. THE WILLIAMS OPINIONS
A. THE OPINION OF THE COURT 
The opinion of the Court, for a majority of five, was written
by Justice Stephen Breyer; Chief Justice Roberts, Justice
Kennedy, Justice Souter, and Justice Alito concurred.36 The
Court began by describing the facts and procedural history of
the case and noting that, although it had granted certiorari on
whether there was a nonparty harm problem and whether the
award was grossly excessive, it was only going to address the
former.37 Thus, while the object of the Court’s scrutiny was “a
large state punitive damages award,” the question addressed
was “whether the Constitution’s Due Process Clause permits a
jury to base that award in part on its desire to punish the defen-
dant for harming persons who are not before the court (e.g.,
victims whom the parties do not represent).”38 Justice Breyer’s
answer, speaking for the Court, was negative:  “We hold that
such an award would amount to a taking of ‘property’ from the
defendant without due process.”39 In light of that holding, the
Court vacated the Oregon judgment and remanded to the
Oregon Supreme Court for “further proceedings not inconsis-
tent with this opinion.”40
Justice Breyer offered two arguments for the statement that
22. State Farm, 538 U.S. 408,  425 (2003).
23. Id. at 427-28.
24. Id. at 422.
25. Id.
26. Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. 257, 275 (1989).
27. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1991) (Blackmun, J.).
28. Id. at 24 (Scalia, J., concurring).
29. See, e.g., State Farm, 538 U.S. 408, 429 (2003) (Thomas, J., dis-
senting).
30. Atlantic Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 129 S. Ct. 2561 (2009).
31. BMW, 517 U.S. 559,  598 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (with
Justice Thomas joining); TXO, 509 U.S. 443, 470 (1993) (Scalia,
J. concurring) (with Justice Thomas joining).
32. 517 U.S. 559, 607 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (with Chief Justice
Rehnquist joining).
33. 492 U.S. 257, 282 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part).
34. 509 U.S. 443 (1993) (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319
(1976)).
35. 517 U.S. 559, 586 (1996) (Breyer, J., concurring).
36. Williams, 549 U.S. 346 (2007).
37. Id. at 352.
38. Id. at 349 (emphasis in original).
39. Id.









41. Id. at 353-54.
42. Id. at 354.
43. Id. at 355.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 353.
46. Id. at 356-57 (“We did not previously hold explicitly that a jury
may not punish for the harm caused others.   But we do so hold
now.”).
47 Id. at 355.
48. Id. at 357.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 358.
51. Id. 
52. Williams, 549 U.S. at 358  (Stevens, J., dissenting).
53. Williams, 549 U.S. at 361 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
54. Williams, 549 U.S. at 362 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
it is a violation of due process to permit the jury to punish the
defendant for injuring nonparties:  The first is that Philip
Morris is entitled, as a matter of due process, to have an oppor-
tunity to defend itself against the charges made, “by showing,
for example in a case such as this, that the other victim was not
entitled to damages because he or she knew that smoking was
dangerous or did not rely upon the defendant’s statements to
the contrary.”41 Breyer’s tacit assumption appears to be that
the alleged other victims’ nonparty status renders it procedu-
rally infeasible to run this, and other, defenses.  
The second argument is that the number of nonparties and
the extent of their harm are too “standardless” to pass muster
under the Due Process Clause.  
How many such victims are there?  How seriously
were they injured?   Under what circumstances did the
injury occur?   The trial will not likely answer such
questions as to nonparty victims.   The jury will be left
to speculate.  And the fundamental due process con-
cerns to which our punitive damages cases refer—risks
of arbitrariness, uncertainty, and lack of notice—will be
magnified.42
After offering a dense argument that this treatment of the
nonparty-harm rule was not inconsistent with its prior deci-
sions on punitive damages—particularly BMW—the Court
went on to concede that a plaintiff may present evidence of
harm to nonparties because “harm to others shows more rep-
rehensible conduct.”43
Evidence of actual harm to nonparties can help to
show that the conduct that harmed the plaintiff also
posed a risk of harm to the public, or the converse.   Yet
for the reasons given above, a jury may not go further
than this and use a punitive damages verdict to punish a
defendant directly on account of harms it is alleged to
have visited on nonparties.44
An insufficiently recognized feature of the Court’s opinion
is that it yielded not one but five interrelated procedural due-
process dictates, each nested within the prior one.   It began
with a pair of dictates that are more theoretical.  First, as we
have seen, 
[1] “the Constitution’s Due Process Clause forbids a state to
use a punitive damages award to punish a defendant for
injury that it inflicts upon nonparties or those whom they
directly represent, i.e., injury that it inflicts upon those
who are, essentially, strangers to the litigation.”45
The Court’s discussion of this issue indicates that it is
largely focused upon what it regards as the most com-
mon version of this
problem:  a jury is asked
to decide on the puni-
tive-damages award and
is invited by the plain-
tiff’s lawyer to use the
punitive-damages award
to punish the defendant
for harming nonparties.
Thus, a second dictate
is that 
[2] “a jury” may not use
punitive damages to punish a defendant for harming non-
parties.46
The latter three dictates are more practical and are
derived from the theoretical analysis:   [3] “the Due
Process Clause requires States to provide assurance that
juries are not asking the wrong question, i.e., seeking, not
simply to determine reprehensibility, but also to punish for
harm caused strangers.”47
[4] “[S]tate courts cannot authorize procedures that create
an unreasonable and unnecessary risk” that “a jury, in tak-
ing account of harm caused others under the rubric of rep-
rehensibility, also seeks to punish the defendant for having
caused injury to others [].”48
And finally, 
[5] in appropriate cases, a court must, “upon request, pro-
tect against that risk.”49
Because the Court believed that Philip Morris’s appeal was
considered by the Oregon Supreme Court within a framework
that, understandably but incorrectly, rejected the five points I
have just discussed, the Court concluded its opinion by
remanding to the Oregon Supreme Court to reconsider Philip
Morris’s appeal by applying “the standard we have set forth.”50
Critically, the Court appears to have left it open for the courts
below it in Williams to remedy any nonparty-harm problem it
might find in either of two ways:  retrial or remittitur.
“Because the application of this new standard may lead to the
need for a new trial, or a change in the level of the punitive
damages award, we shall not consider whether the award is
constitutionally ‘grossly excessive.’”51
B. THE DISSENTING OPINIONS
Justice Stevens52 and Justice Thomas53 each wrote a solo
dissenting opinion.   Justice Ginsburg also wrote a dissenting
opinion, in which Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas con-
curred.54
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55. Id. at 360 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at  361 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
57. Or. Rev. Stat. § 31.735(1) (2003).   For a comprehensive descrip-
tion (and spirited defense) of split-recovery statutes, see Catherine
M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, 113 YALE L. J.
347, 375-80 (2003).
58. Id. at  363 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting App. 280a).
59. Id. at 363 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
1. Justice Stevens’s Dissent
Justice Stevens’s crisp and
cogent dissent hits three points:
(1) punitive damages are pun-
ishment, not compensation, so
nonparty harm is relevant to
reprehensibility and the infeasi-
bility of Philip Morris (or any
other defendant) defending
itself regarding the actual harm
caused nonparties is irrelevant;
(2) the Court has drawn an elusive and unjustifiable distinc-
tion between the impermissibility of punishing for nonparty
harm and adding damages for increased reprehensibility
demonstrated by nonparty harm; and (3) the core of the
Court’s due-process doctrine on punitive damages is about
substantive due process and excessiveness, and it is unwise to
break new ground as the Court has here.    
For our purposes, (2) is the most important.  Justice
Stevens’s paragraph encapsulating this critique is the most often
quoted by those scholars who criticize the Court’s decision:
While apparently recognizing the novelty of its hold-
ing, the majority relies on a distinction between taking
third-party harm into account in order to asses the rep-
rehensibility of the defendant’s conduct—which is per-
mitted—from doing so in order to punish the defendant
“directly”—which is forbidden.   The nuance eludes me.
When a jury increases a punitive damages award because
injuries to third parties enhanced the reprehensibility of
the defendant’s conduct, the jury is by definition pun-
ishing the defendant—directly—for third-party harm.
A murderer who kills his victim by throwing a bomb that
injures dozens of bystanders should be punished more
severely than one who harms no one other than his
intended victim.   Similarly, there is no reason why the
measure of the appropriate punishment for engaging in
a campaign of deceit in distributing a poisonous addic-
tive substance to thousands of cigarette smokers
statewide should not include consideration of the harm
to those “bystanders” as well as the harm to the individ-
ual plaintiff.55
2. Justice Thomas’s Dissent
Justice Thomas dissented separately in order to reiterate his
opposition to constitutional review of the size of punitive-
damages awards based on his longstanding view that punitive
damages were accepted in 1868, when the 14th Amendment
was ratified.  While Justice Breyer’s opinion for the Court
styled itself as “procedural” rather than comfortably embracing
the “substantive” label that Justice Stevens prefers, Justice
Thomas registered his opinion that the different word choice
concealed an underlying commonality between the Court’s
approach in this case and its approach to prior cases, which he
(along with Justice Scalia) vigorously opposed.  “It matters not
that the Court styles today’s holding as ‘procedural’ because the
‘procedural’ rule is simply a confusing implementation of the
substantive due process regime this Court has created for puni-
tive damages.”56
By far the most notable feature of Justice Thomas’s dissent
is what is missing:  Justice Scalia’s agreement.  The originalist
approach to the Due Process Clause is of course the hallmark
of Justice Scalia’s concurrence in Haslip and his dissents in
BMW and State Farm; indeed, it is a hallmark of Justice Scalia’s
originalism more generally.  It is tempting to infer that Justice
Scalia may be closer in his view of due process in Williams to
that of Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito; he may regard
the difference between procedural due process and substantive
due process as significant at least in the context of this litiga-
tion in the state of Oregon, which has a split-recovery statute.57
Justice Scalia’s decision to join Justice Ginsburg’s dissent (see
below) is consistent with the possibility that he regards the
procedural due-process line on punitive damages, in states
with newfangled punitive-damages law, as consistent with
originalism.
3. Justice Ginsburg’s Dissent
Justice Ginsburg’s opinion may not be as conciliatory as it
appears; it is unclear.  It asserts that she agrees with the Court’s
recognition of the role of nonparty harm to the issue of repre-
hensibility.  However, once the Court decided to permit non-
party harm to come in on the reprehensibility issue, the opin-
ion contends, the Court has undermined any reasons for criti-
cizing the Oregon Supreme Court.  Like Justice Stevens, Justice
Ginsburg seemed to balk at the idea that there is a difference
between punishing indirectly, through the added reprehensi-
bility nonparty harm indicates, and punishing directly for
injuring nonparties.    
Justice Ginsburg’s skepticism about the Court’s distinction
becomes clearer with her second argument:  that the only issue
preserved by Philip Morris on appeal regarding nonparty harm
is the issue of whether the trial court erred by declining to give
Philip Morris’s proposed jury instruction.  The proposed
instruction cautioned the jury that they may consider nonparty
harm in determining the reasonable relationship between the
punishment of Philip Morris and the harm caused to the party,
Jesse Williams, but “you are not to punish the defendant for
the impact of its alleged misconduct on other persons. . . .”58
Her criticism echoes Justice Stevens’s:  “Under that charge,
just what use could the jury properly make of ‘the extent of
harm suffered by others.’?  The answer slips from my grasp.  A
judge seeking to enlighten rather than confuse surely would
resist delivering the directed charge.”59 In a piece of the analy-
sis that figured significantly in oral argument and anticipated
subsequent proceedings in the Oregon Supreme Court, Justice
Ginsburg opined that an affirmance, not a remand, was in
order because the only argument Philip Morris had preserved
138 Court Review - Volume 44 
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60. Williams v. Philip Morris, Inc., 176 P.3d 1255 (Or. 2008).
61. Williams, 176 P.3d at 1261 (quoting Beglau v. Albertus, 536 P.2d
1251 (Or. 1975)).
62. Id. at 1263-64.
63. Philip Morris’s Petition for Certiorari in Philip Morris USA v.
Williams, 2008 WL 795148 (March 24, 2008).
64. Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 128 S. Ct. 2904 (June 9, 2008)
(granting certiorari on first issue only). 
65. Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 129 S. Ct. 1436 (March 31, 2009)
(per curiam).
on appeal pertained to the
rejected jury instruction, which
the trial judge correctly
decided.   
C. WILLIAMS ON
REMAND IN OREGON
AND IN THE U.S.
SUPREME COURT’S
2008 TERM
The Oregon Supreme Court was plainly disconcerted to find
itself with Williams again; equally plainly, the Court did not
feel it needed to waste much time or energy on remand.  It sim-
ply reaffirmed the rejection of Philip Morris’s appeal notwith-
standing the Supreme Court’s critique of its analytical frame-
work and consequent remand.60 The Oregon Supreme Court
used its special competency in Oregon law to narrow the
grounds of the appeal.  It first reasoned that, since Philip
Morris had not objected to the instructions actually given, it
could not appeal the instructions given, only the refusal to give
its proposed instruction.  The Court then reasoned, critically,
that refusal to give the instruction would not have been an
error unless the instruction was completely correct.  “In
Oregon, there is a well-understood standard governing claims
of error respecting a trial judge’s refusal to give a proffered
instruction:  An appellate court will not reverse a trial court’s
refusal to give a proposed jury instruction, unless the proposed
instruction was “‘clear and correct in all respects, both in form
and in substance, and . . . altogether free from error.’”61
Its resolution of the issue therefore turned on whether
Philip Morris’s proposed nonparty-harm rule was correct in all
respects and free from error.  The Oregon Supreme Court eas-
ily concluded that, as a matter of Oregon law, the proposed
instruction was incorrect in many respects.  It therefore
rejected Philip Morris’s appeal and affirmed the punitive dam-
ages verdict.62
Philip Morris petitioned the United States Supreme Court
for certiorari again on two issues: 
1. Whether, after this Court has adjudicated the merits
of a party’s federal claim and remanded the case to
state court with instructions to “apply” the correct
constitutional standard, the state court may interpose
- for the first time in the litigation - a state-law proce-
dural bar that is neither firmly established nor regu-
larly followed.
2. Whether a punitive-damages award that is 97 times
the compensatory damages may be upheld on the
ground that the reprehensibility of a defendant’s con-
duct can “override” the constitutional requirement
that punitive damages be reasonably related to the
plaintiff’s harm.63
The Supreme Court granted certiorari but limited it to the
first issue.64 Oral argument took place on December 3, 2008,
but on March 31, 2009, the Court dismissed the petition as
improvidently granted in a one-sentence per curiam order.65
III. TROUBLES WITH WILLIAMS
Justice Breyer offered two arguments for the statement that
it is a violation of due process to permit the jury to punish the
defendant for injuring nonparties, but neither is persuasive.
The first is that Philip Morris ought to be able to defend itself
against the charges that it has caused injury to nonparties, and
their nonparty status renders this procedurally infeasible.  The
problem with this superficially plausible complaint is that,
while the right to defend oneself against the charge of having
wronged another by litigating against the alleged victim is
highly relevant if the issue involves liability for the costs of that
victim’s injury, the reason for that appears to be the relevance
of the connection between the defendant’s wrongful conduct
and the victim’s alleged damages.  The existence of the harm
goes to damages and requires litigating against the victim; the
connection between the wrongdoing and the harm is an issue
of causation, and again requires the victim.  The entitlement of
the victim to shift these costs is under attack when affirmative
defenses are being considered and again requires litigating
against the victim.  But all of these appear irrelevant if the issue
is whether the defendant should be punished for the wrong-
doing rather than whether the defendant should be held
responsible for the harm inflicted upon the plaintiff.  Perhaps
the most powerful proof of this point is that a crime victim is
not a party to a criminal prosecution.   
The second argument is that the number of nonparties and
the extent of their harm is too vague for due-process standards,
and therefore the defendant cannot be punished for the harm
to nonparties.  But then it is entirely perplexing why the num-
ber of nonparties and extent of harm should be permitted to
come in under the guise of reprehensibility.  If punishment can
be extended for added reprehensibility, and number and extent
of harm is a permissible basis for inferring added reprehensi-
bility, then the same vagueness problem exists.  
There are other problems with the Court’s opinion in Philip
Morris, and they exist at many levels.  For one thing, although
the Court does acknowledge that some of its earlier deci-
sions—including BMW v. Gore—appear to treat the inclusion
of nonparty harm as an entirely normal and unobjectionable
aspect of state tort law, it does so almost grudgingly, making lit-
tle effort to be candid about the mixed messages of prior deci-
sions or about the need for an increasingly pro-defendant line
on this point.  The larger concern on this point is a federalist
one:  inclusion of nonparty harm frequently is a feature—and
an accepted feature—of state tort law of punitive damages; the
better entrenched, utilized, and recognized an aspect of state
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66. See, e.g, Keith N. Hylton, Reflections on Remedies and Philip Morris
v. Williams, 27 REV. LITIG. 9, 30 (2007).   But see Mark A. Geistfeld,
Punitive Damages, Retribution, and Due Process, 81 S. CAL. L. REV.
263 (2008) (offering an entirely different way of justifying the
Court’s effort to split these issues).
67. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 357 (citing Witte v. United States, 515
U.S. 389 (1995)).
68. Id. at 355.
69. Id. at 357 (“where the risk of that misunderstanding is a signifi-
cant one—because, for instance, of the sort of evidence that was
introduced at trial or the kinds of argument the plaintiff made to
the jury—a court, upon request, must protect against that risk.”).
The words “upon request” may create the impression that there is
a requirement of a request of some sort of precaution.  However,
in just the prior sentence the Court had indicated a broader-
sounding duty:  “state courts cannot authorize procedures that
create an unreasonable and unnecessary risk” that juries will pun-
ish defendants for injuring nonparties under “the rubric of repre-
hensibility.”   
70. See Part VI.B, infra.
through constitutional basis for deeming it impermissible.
Perhaps the largest problem is whether the Court has a gen-
uine basis for its subtle distinction between the impermissibil-
ity of increasing punitive damages because one is punishing for
injuries to nonparties and the permissibility of increasing
punitive damages because the harm to other parties displays
added reprehensibility of the conduct that injured the plaintiff.
Justice Stevens openly displayed complete disbelief on this
point, and leading commentators have shared this assess-
ment.66
Justice Breyer anticipated Stevens’s criticism, but neither of
his responses to it is persuasive.  One is that recidivists can be
punished more seriously because of prior conduct that is not
part of the particular crime at issue; the prior wrongful con-
duct seems, in some sense, to be a ground for deeming the rep-
rehensibility level to be higher.67 This is an unhelpful point
because the prior conduct will have been subjected to appro-
priate procedural safeguards, unlike that which is permitted in
the punitives context.  More helpful, it seems, is Breyer’s recog-
nition that 
[e]vidence of actual harm to nonparties can help to
show that the conduct that harmed the plaintiff also
posed a substantial risk of harm to the general public,
and so was particularly reprehensible—although coun-
sel may argue in a particular case that conduct resulting
in no harm to others nevertheless posed a grave risk to
the public, or the converse.  Yet for the reasons given
above, a jury may not go further than this and use a
punitive damages verdict to punish a defendant directly
on account of harms it is alleged to have visited on non-
parties.68
The problem is that Breyer’s distinction seems to become
unimportant, to the point of triviality, in certain contexts, and
Williams—indeed, most punitive damages cases involving large
manufacturers—involves exactly that context.  If the defen-
dant’s knowledge or tortious marketing of a dangerous product
to a large group is in question, then the magnitude of the risk
generated by that marketing campaign is relevant to the repre-
hensibility of the marketing campaign.  So long as the number
of people injured can be used to demonstrate the magnitude of
the risk generated, then the number of people injured can be
used to demonstrate the reprehensibility of the conduct.
Moreover, punishing the defendant for conduct that was partic-
ularly reprehensible because it generated such a high amount of
risk—and showing that by indicating how many people were
injured—appears only marginally different than punishing
them for injuring the others.  After all, one might think, what
we are really punishing
when we punish for injur-
ing people is the conduct
that injured the people, not
the fact of their having been
injured.  If the conduct that
injured or killed the plain-
tiff was the conduct that
injured all of these others,
and that conduct was more
reprehensible because of its
demonstrated potentiality
to injure others, then its
having injured others is
going to come into the rep-
rehensibility analysis. 
Although lower courts
will soon be forced to deal
with the problems inherent
in Williams’s lack of clarity, they have not thus far faced huge
challenges.  That is due largely to a peculiar and perhaps inten-
tional feature of the Court’s decision in Williams:  while it
crafted a potentially broad due-process right of defendants to
be judged by properly instructed juries, the Court included
language that could be interpreted as suggesting there would
be no violation of such a right unless the defendant had proffered
an appropriately protective jury instruction which the lower court
wrongly rejected.69 If this is so, then for any appeal based on
litigation before Williams there is unlikely to be any viable due-
process claim unless the defendant at the time of trial antici-
pated the Court’s ruling in Williams and proposed jury instruc-
tions suited to this anticipated decision.  Unsurprisingly, this
rarely occurred.  Hence, a number of cases appealed since
Williams have been affirmed on the ground that no proper jury
instruction was requested by the defendant.70
The protection of plaintiffs stemming from pre-Williams
requests for jury instructions will only last so long, of course.
Indeed, today’s defense lawyers are bound to be offering a wide
variety of Williams-crafted jury instructions and motions more
generally, some dictated by incontrovertible readings of the
opinion, some by more aggressive and pro-defendant readings.
At a minimum, courts are to instruct a jury, at least when
requested, that when nonparty harm is used for reprehensibil-
ity, the jury must be cautioned not to punish the defendant for
causing nonparty harm.  Part IV, which follows, sketches an
explanation of what this could mean and why it is justifiable.   
At a minimum,
courts are to instruct
a jury, at least
when requested,
that when nonparty
harm is used for
reprehensibility, the
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In order to understand
the constitutional scrutiny
of punitive damages, one
needs to begin with an
insight that is cogent and
plausible from an intuitive
point of view and yet
patently false from the point
of view of constitutional doctrine: 
Simple public-sanction/private-damages dichotomy:
Since punitive damages involve the state’s imposition of
a punitive sanction upon a defendant for an especially
wrongful act, punitive damages are properly subjected to
whatever heightened level of constitutional scrutiny is
applicable to state punishments and punitive sanctions
for wrongful conduct.   
There is substantial legal plausibility to the idea that punitive
damages are enough like punishments that the constitutional
safeguards provided to criminal defendants should be applied
to defendants facing claims for punitive damages by private
plaintiffs.  Indeed, in the years preceding the Court’s early deci-
sions on punitive damages, a small but significant cluster of
analytically impressive articles made essentially that point.71
But every judge and lawyer should also see that the Supreme
Court has never adopted this view, and has, in fact, adopted a
civil framework for understanding punitive damages that does
not demand criminal procedural safeguards.  Moreover, the
Supreme Court (like the overwhelming majority of state courts)
seems to have looked the quasi-criminal aspects of punitive
damages straight in the eye and decided that while they might
be something of a civil/criminal hybrid, they shall be regarded
as civil damages for constitutional purposes.72 And so it is nat-
ural to reject the public-sanction/private-damages dichotomy as
the foundation for analyzing the constitutional status of puni-
tive damages, putting to an end the hope that such a simple
observation will really clarify matters.
In recent years, I—and a handful of other scholars of torts,
legal history, and constitutional law, including Judge Guido
Calabresi and Professors Colby, Goldberg, Markel, and Sebok—
have decided to give the public-sanction/private-damages
dichotomy a second look.73 I believe the results have been
fruitful, and lead, somewhat surprisingly, back to this simple
idea as the way to understand the constitutional status of puni-
tive damages.  But the idea cannot remain quite so straightfor-
ward if it is to withstand serious evaluation, and indeed there is
a variety of different academic accounts of punitive damages,
each with its own complications.  However, the gist of the
analysis can be stated quite simply.
We must begin with the reality that punitive-damages
awards in virtually every state today can, and often do, involve
a compound of different legal principles:  they frequently
embody both a state-imposed sanction and a private-damages
award intended as part of the remedy to which the injured
plaintiff is entitled.74
Second, the idea that a punitive-damages award offers a
means of deterring corporate actors from engaging in public
wrongs is largely a development of the twentieth century,
and—while it may have been well-motivated—can neverthe-
less be understood as a graft of something foreign onto the tra-
ditional common-law conception of punitive damages, not
within the core notion of punitive damages before that time.75
By contrast, the notion of permitting a private plaintiff to be
vindicated by allowing her to exact damages beyond what is
needed to make herself whole when she was wronged in a par-
ticularly willful or wanton manner lies at the common-law
core of punitive damages.76 While both of these ideas are
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Romo.  See note 98, infra, for further discussion.
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too vague).  But so much the worse, of course, for the alleged
ground of the public sanction—there is not even a statute.
84. Zipursky, A Theory of Punitive Damages, at 161-64.
about being punitive and deterring powerful actors by communi-
cating that they will be held accountable, the more traditional
one is really intended predominantly to supplement the private
redress to which a victim is normally entitled, while the more
modern notion is intended to supplement state enforcement
efforts by adding sanctions through tort law.  I will refer to the
former, more traditional model, as “the private-redress model”
and the latter, more modern one, as “the public-sanction
model.”
The third point is that the private-redress model is on a dif-
ferent constitutional footing than the public-sanction model
both as a historical matter and as a political theoretic matter.
Professor Colby’s version of this point was sufficiently power-
fully made to attract the attention of the Fifth District Court of
Appeals in California.77 Historically, the “grandfathering” of
punitive damages under the Due Process Clause makes some
sense if the phrase “punitive damages” today refers to the same
principles and forms of law that existed when the clause was
ratified; it makes little sense if it is entirely different legal crea-
ture hiding behind the same words.78 And as a political theo-
retic matter—as I have argued at length elsewhere—the state’s
involvement when it is exacting damages from an individual in
order to empower the victim of a wrong is quite different than
when it is doing so as a matter of sanctioning actors for violat-
ing state-created legal rules of conduct.  It is justifiable that our
requirements of due process are different, and more modest,
when the state is playing its role in facilitating a plaintiff’s
efforts to achieve private redress than when it is imposing
sanctions albeit through the efforts of private parties.79
The most striking difference in constitutional safeguards
has to do with notice of which conduct will warrant state sanc-
tion and which sanction, or range of sanctions, the defendant
will be subjected to.   Criminal law has exacting versions of
such standards;80 the common law of torts is evolutionary,
incremental, and depends on individual damages awards, and
our constitutional system has always deemed that adequate.81
Regulations lie in-between; substantial notice of the nature of
conduct prohibited and the magnitude of the sanctions is
required.82 State law that fails this test is void for vagueness.
Thus, where the state is doing public-sanction imposition
without adequate delineation of prohibited conduct or range of
permissible sanctions (thereby granting the jury too much dis-
cretion to impose a monetary penalty), there is a procedural
due-process problem.83
B. THE NONPARTY-HARM
RULE AS A PUBLIC
SANCTION
DETECTION TEST
In every jurisdiction that
has what I am calling “com-
pound” punitive-damages law,
different verdicts may embody
quite different proportions (so
to speak) of the two models,
and some do so quite clearly
while others remain quite
ambiguous.  Even where a jurisdiction openly embraces a pub-
lic-sanction justification for its punitive-damages law, it may
well be that jurors in a particular case are conceiving the puni-
tive damages on a private-redress model.   Conversely, in juris-
dictions in which courts have not gone out of their way to
direct jurors to a public-sanction model, plaintiffs’ lawyers and
the narrative of the litigation may have done effectively the
same thing, and in such cases, the state’s enforcement of a
judgment on a jury verdict must be understood as involving
the public-sanction model.   BMW v. Gore was such a case, as I
have argued elsewhere.84 Other cases are quite ambiguous.  In
these, it is clear enough that the jury wished the defendant to
be deterred as well as wishing the plaintiff to be afforded
greater redress.  But it is not clear whether the legal system is
essentially imagining giving the plaintiff a higher verdict in
order that she or he be empowered to exact damages because
of the wrong to her or him or whether the jury is understand-
ing the state to be, in effect, kicking in its own public-sanction
system, regardless of whether the victim is entitled to that
redress.
The constitutional status of the award turns on this.  If the
state is simply empowering a private plaintiff to exact greater
damages in order to recognize a heightened level of redress,
there is no ground for altering the constitutional scrutiny to
which defendant is entitled from that which state tort law ordi-
narily provides.  However, if the plaintiff’s lawsuit is in part a
vehicle for the state to impose its own public sanctions, then
greater constitutional safeguards are in order.  That is the con-
stitutional defect.
The framework just elaborated raises a critical question in a
wide swath of cases:  Is the verdict part state-imposed public
sanction or not?  If it is, and the state supplied only its usual
process for tort plaintiffs, then the process was constitutionally
inadequate.  If not—if the entire verdict could plausibly be
There are four 
different kinds of
frameworks that a





85. Cf.  Paul Rietema, Reconceptualizing Split-Recovery Statutes After
Philip Morris v. Williams, 127 S.Ct. 1057 (2007),  31 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 1159 (2008) (noting ways of re-interpreting split-recov-
ery statutes so as to avoid inference of unconstitutionality but
indicating strong argument for unconstitutionality after
Williams).
86. Because the foregoing analysis obviously seizes upon a void-for-
vagueness procedural due-process critique of punitive damages, it
may seem to be inconsistent with current Supreme Court doc-
trine.  After all, the Court’s opinion in Haslip expressly rejected a
void-for-vagueness challenge.  Only Justice O’Connor was willing
to embrace the void-for-vagueness critique.  
Reading too much significance into the 8-1 ruling in Haslip is a
mistake of black-and-white thinking.  The framework I have laid
out contemplates that not all punitive damages awards fall into
the same constitutional category.  That is, of course, just the point.
While there are some punitive damages awards that are fairly
viewed as purely a matter of private redress, there are others that
are not fairly so viewed and those must be viewed as, at least in
part, public sanction.  The Haslip Court did not reject this view; it
did not even address this question.  There is no reason to attribute
to those Justices an opinion on whether punitive damages can be
viewed as coming in different types and whether, if so, some of the
types should be subject to a different level of scrutiny than that
which eight Justices deemed appropriate in Haslip.  
The proposal here is that five Justices in the Williams majority
can be understood as implicitly setting forth conditions on when
they will be willing to indulge the Haslip majority presumption
that punitive damages are operating as private redress, and when
they will no longer be willing to indulge that presumption, and will,
instead, treat punitive damages as public sanctions. Notably, two of
the Justices who joined the Court’s opinion in BMW—Souter and
(again) O’Connor—embraced the discretion-curbing conception
of due process as applicable to punitive damages awards in Justice
Breyer’s concurrence.   Moreover, Justice Kennedy’s majority opin-
ion in State Farm displays perhaps the Court’s most vigorous
expression to date of concern over the unchanneled discretion
applied by the Utah jury to the punitive-damages award in that
case and therefore seemed to regard punitive-damages awards as
properly susceptible to vagueness-based procedural due-process
challenges.  Although Justice O’Connor is no longer on the Court,
the other three—Justice Breyer, Justice Souter, and Justice
Kennedy—were the very three members of the Rehnquist Court
whom Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito were willing to join.
Of the eight Justices voting against the petitioner in Haslip, only
three remain:  Justice Kennedy (who has become an impassioned
critic of punitive damages), Justice Stevens, and Justice Scalia.
The latter two are, of course, part of the dissent in Williams.
understood as simply private
redress—then there is no need,
as a constitutional matter, for
better defined constraints on
conduct definition or sanction
levels.    The answer to the ques-
tion therefore determines
whether there is a procedural due-process problem.
There are four different kinds of frameworks that a court
asked to do constitutional review of punitive damages might
adopt.  The simplest would be to assume, in a spirit of defer-
ence to state courts and anxiety about drawing the distinction,
that all punitive damages should be understood to be more or
less exclusively a version of what was contemplated in the com-
mon law of the nineteenth century:  as a part of individual pri-
vate redress (albeit sometimes aimed at deterrence or making
an example of a defendant).  In this case, there would be no
basis for constitutional review, at least on the analysis offered.
The dissenters in BMW appear to have favored this view.      
The polar opposite approach would be to assume that no
punitive-damages awards in today’s legal system are exclu-
sively of the private-redress type.  On that view, all are to that
degree in need of greater process than they receive.   Justice
O’Connor’s Haslip dissent can be interpreted as taking this
view.  Had it been adopted by the majority in Haslip, it would
have entailed an immediate crisis of constitutionality for puni-
tive damages in every jurisdiction.
If neither of these extremes is selected, then what is needed
is an intermediate position that would require the Court to
articulate a criterion or criteria for determining whether a
given award should be understood as, at least in part, a public
sanction.  In short, a “public-sanction detection test” is
needed.  Here again one is faced with a choice:  should the cri-
teria be facial or contextual or a combination of the two?  By
“facial” (in this context) I mean that a court could take stock
of concrete changes that have been made in various jurisdic-
tions in the structure of their punitive-damages law as possible
grounds for an across-the-board recategorization of the awards
in that state.   Thus, for example, a state’s decision to funnel
punitive-damages awards to the state revenue would be a
strong basis for inferring that all of the awards in that state are
conceived of as, at least in part, public sanctions; in this sce-
nario, all should be subject to void-for-vagueness scrutiny.85
A contextual public-sanction detection test, by contrast,
would aim to evaluate the evidence presented to the jury, the
narrative presented to the jury, the instruction of the jury by
the Court, and the verdict the jury arrived at.  This evaluation
would help ascertain whether the jury’s damages award is plau-
sibly understood as simply a judgment by the jury of what the
plaintiff was entitled to exact from the defendant as a matter of
private redress for the wrong done to him or whether it must
be understood, at least in part, as the delivery of a public sanc-
tion.  If the result is the latter, then the award violates due
process because the tort process fails, on void-for-vagueness
grounds, to comply with what the Constitution requires of
public sanctions.   
The nonparty-harm rule of Williams may be seen as a con-
textual public-sanction detection test.  Where the jury is asked
to punish the defendant for harm to nonparties, the punitive
damages are plainly aimed as something beyond redress for the
injury done to the private plaintiff.  They are specifically about
the injury done to others, not the injury done to the plaintiff.
Thus, we must infer that the award is intended in part as a pub-
lic sanction.  But if this is so, then the tort process is not
enough, and there is a procedural due-process violation.86
The Court in Williams was interestingly misled by the pro-
cedural soundness of the nonparty-harm rule to think that the
procedural defect was the very same attribute that made the
punitive-damages award detectable as a public sanction: the
additional, nonjoined persons whom the plaintiff is alleging
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were harmed by the defendant and in light of whom extra
damages ought to be imposed.  That was a mistake.  The non-
joinder of nonparties simply makes it clear that the state is
imposing damages on defendant for injuring someone but not
as a matter of permitting the victim/plaintiff to redress the wrong
to her; it follows that the state is permitting the imposition of
damages as a state-imposed sanction, not as private redress.
But once we know that, we know there are more fundamental
procedural due-process violations, viz,. those sounding in
void-for-vagueness doctrine.   
C. THE REPREHENSIBILITY CRITIQUE REVISITED
Let us now turn to the “reprehensibility” critiques, both the-
oretical and practical.  The theoretical critique said that it was
incoherent to forbid inflation of punitive damages on a one-step
route in which the defendant is punished for injuring nonpar-
ties, while simultaneously permitting punitive-damages infla-
tion on a two-step reprehensibility route.  On the two-step route,
the jury is permitted to inflate punitive damages in light of the
added reprehensibility of defendant’s conduct, and it is permit-
ted to find the defendant’s conduct more reprehensible because
the defendant injured nonparties.  Either way, injuring nonpar-
ties leads to greater punitive damages, the argument goes.
The critique is easily met on the public-sanction-detection-
test theory.   Reprehensibility is relevant to punitive damages
both within the private-redress model and within the public-
sanction theory, but a threshold question must be answered
either way:  which of the defendant’s allegedly reprehensible
acts is the jury to be evaluating?  Trivially, the answer is this:
whichever act is the basis of defendant’s liability is the act
whose reprehensibility is to be evaluated for punitive damages.
The reprehensibility evaluation on the public-sanction model
targets whatever acts the defendant is being sanctioned for.
The sanction can be imposed for injury to nonparties, or even
for conduct that is considered only on the basis of its potential
(but unrealized) impact, not its actual impact.  For example,
inchoate crimes including attempts and conspiracy can be
penalized, so can the act of risking injury to a wide range of
people.  By contrast, on the private-redress model, the focus is
much narrower:  the act whose reprehensibility is to be evalu-
ated is the wronging of the plaintiff.  It is the latter that should
guide the reprehensibility analysis given the logic ascribed to
the majority in Williams. 
Contrary to what Justice Stevens asserted, then, harm to
nonparties is not directly relevant to the reprehensibility analy-
sis.  Although harm to nonparties might be directly relevant on
the public-sanction model, it is not directly relevant on the pri-
vate-redress model, and the latter is what should count.  If it is
relevant at all on the private-redress model, it is indirectly 
relevant.  Greater injury to nonparties can display greater risk-
iness, which in turn could entail greater reprehensibility.  But
we need to be more careful here because the act of risking is
not the basis of liability; the act of tortiously injuring is the basis
of liability.  Does the reprehensibility of the tortious injuring of
the plaintiff change depending on how risky the conduct was
and how many others were injured?   Perhaps.  If, for example,
a defendant sold a product knowing full well that the same
product had killed hundreds of people in the past, that action
is more reprehensible than selling a product that occasionally
has caused some health prob-
lems.  Prior injury to nonpar-
ties, if the defendant knew of
it or remained willfully blind
to such injuries, is evidence
that the defendant recklessly
injured the plaintiff, rather
than negligently doing so, for
example.  Indeed, actual or
constructive knowledge of
prior injury to nonparties is
grounds for ratcheting up the
reprehensibility of the manner in which the defendant injured
the plaintiff.
On the other hand, concurrent or subsequent injury to non-
parties will typically not be relevant to the reprehensibility of
the defendant’s conduct under the private-redress model.
Ordinarily, it will not tend to show any greater degree of reck-
lessness or indifference in the risks that the defendant was tak-
ing toward the plaintiff when the defendant tortiously injured
him.  For the same reason, past injuries of which the defendant
neither was aware nor should have been aware will not ordi-
narily be relevant to the reprehensibility of the defendant’s
wronging of the plaintiff.  The reprehensibility of the defen-
dant’s injuring of the plaintiff does not lie in the riskiness of
the conduct per se but in the riskiness willfully or recklessly
undertaken. 
For related reasons, there are some cases in which the rep-
rehensibility concept within the private-redress model will not
justify admitting evidence of prior nonparty harm and will not
justify attention within a jury instruction.  If the defendant has
already admitted knowledge of the degree of riskiness of the
conduct in question or if the evidence of prior nonparty harm
does not in any way add to the extent of evidence on that issue,
then the defendant may well have a sound argument for
excluding such evidence.  It is not simply its duplication that
might warrant exclusion, but also the risk that it will be con-
sidered for the wrong reasons altogether; that defendant will be
punished for injuring nonparties.  If that is occurring, then
punitive damages are functioning as a public sanction, and less
deferential standards of process are applicable; the law is void
for vagueness.
Evidence of nonparty harm will often be probative of sev-
eral issues in a tort action, and when that is true, it should nor-
mally not be excluded.  In some of these scenarios, it might be
appropriate to caution the jury not to punish for harm to non-
parties, but it would be unnecessary or even confusing in oth-
ers.   Imagine, for example, that a certain plaintiff is suing a
defendant pharmaceutical manufacturer alleging the product
caused him to develop heart disease.  In most jurisdictions, the
standard for design defect requires the jury to perform a
risk/utility test regarding the products design (as compared to
alternative designs).    In this context, it might well be permis-
sible for the plaintiff to introduce evidence that the design fea-
ture that causes heart problems has also caused birth defects
when a woman taking the product becomes pregnant.  The
harm to infants who are in no way related to the litigation is
therefore relevant to liability.  Whether the jury is likely to con-
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87. 1 Ohio Jury Instructions 23.71 (2006) (2008 update). 
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caution is questionable, given that the harmful effect he suf-
fered is quite different.  Similarly, evidence of others suffering
heart disease from a drug with the same chemical makeup
might well be relevant to general causation (i.e., this com-
pound can cause this disease), even if the drug were made by
a different manufacturer.  Again, nonparty harm is probative,
but there is little chance the defendant would be punished for
harm caused by another manufacturer if that harm were only
introduced for showing general causation.  A cautionary
instruction might be unnecessarily confusing or counterpro-
ductive as it may suggest a line of inference that would not
have crossed the jury’s mind in the first place.
By contrast, suppose that there is evidence that this manu-
facturer’s drug caused prior injuries to nonparties, introduced
to show general causation, design defect, and awareness of the
risks of the drug.  Here, the jury might well be drawn to pun-
ishing for the injury to nonparties, and more generally to pun-
ishing for the risky course of conduct.  It should be cautioned
that it is relevant to punitive damages only to the extent that it
bears on the reprehensibility of the defendant’s injuring the
plaintiff through this course of conduct.
On rare occasions, there may be cases in which harm to non-
parties—even concurrent or subsequent harm to nonparties—
would be relevant in a quite different way to the reprehensibil-
ity of the defendant’s conduct; in the cases I am envisioning,
harm to nonparties might be probative of what it is the defen-
dant actually did.   Thus, for example, suppose the defendant
surreptitiously put some alcohol in a punch that he believed the
unsuspecting plaintiff would drink at a social event, and plain-
tiff was hospitalized after drinking the punch. Imagine that the
defendant and the plaintiff dispute how great a risk the defen-
dant was taking for the plaintiff (and therefore how reprehensi-
ble his injuring of her was).   Under these circumstances, a 
relatively high number of other involuntarily intoxicated event
attendees who drank the punch would be indirectly relevant to
the reprehensibility of defendant’s conduct toward the plaintiff,
because it would shed light on how much alcohol defendant
had put in the punch, and, in turn, how great a risk to the plain-
tiff the defendant had deliberately taken.
V. MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS AFTER WILLIAMS
The Model Jury Instructions published in several states and
circuits have made an effort to incorporate the lessons of
Williams.   Below is a sampling from Ohio, California, and the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.   
Ohio’s Model Jury Instructions—as updated in August of
2008—include the following:
6. DAMAGES TO NON-PARTIES (ADDITIONAL).
Evidence was introduced that (insert name of defendant)’s
conduct has resulted in harm to persons other than
(insert name of plaintiff). This evidence may only be con-
sidered for the purpose of helping you decide whether
(insert name of defendant) showed a conscious disregard
for the rights and safety of other persons that had a great
probability of causing substantial harm. However, you
are not to punish (insert
name of defendant) for the
direct harm his/her/its
alleged misconduct
caused to other persons.87
California’s are quite dif-
ferent: 
In arriving at any
award of punitive dam-
ages, consider the follow-
ing factors:
(1) The reprehensibility of the conduct of the defendant;
(2) The amount of punitive damages which will have a
deterrent effect on the defendant in the light of defen-
dant’s financial condition;
(3) That the punitive damages must bear a reasonable
relation to the injury, harm, or damage [actually] suf-
fered by the plaintiff.
[The phrase “injury, harm, or damage” includes not only
that actually caused by the defendant’s conduct but also poten-
tial injury, harm, or damage caused by the defendant’s wrong-
ful conduct.]
[If you find that defendant had a practice of engaging
in, and profiting from wrongful conduct [occurring in
California] similar to that which injured the plaintiff,
that evidence may be considered in deciding the issues
of reprehensibility, whether punitive damages should be
assessed, and if so, the amount of punitive damages to be
awarded. Do not include in your award of damages any
sum that represents damages for injuries to any person
other than the plaintiff[s].]88
The Eighth Circuit’s Instructions read in part: 
If you decide to award punitive damages, you should
consider the following in deciding the amount of puni-
tive damages to award:
1. how [reprehensible] [bad] [offensive] the defendant’s
conduct was. In this regard, you may consider
whether the harm suffered by the plaintiff was physi-
cal or economic or both; whether there was violence,
deceit, intentional malice, reckless disregard for
human health or safety; whether others were harmed
by the same conduct of the defendant that harmed
the plaintiff; and whether there was any repetition of
the wrongful conduct and past conduct of the sort
that harmed the plaintiff;
2. how much harm actually resulted to the plaintiff,
[but not to others,] from the defendant’s wrongful
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90. It is also of concern that the California instruction tells the jury
that:
(3) That the punitive damages must bear a reasonable
relation to the injury, harm, or damage [actually] suffered
by the plaintiff.
[The phrase “injury, harm, or damage” includes not only that
actually caused by the defendant’s conduct but also potential
injury, harm, or damage caused by the defendant’s wrongful con-
duct.]
It is true that punitive damages must bear a reasonable relation
to the injury harm, or damage suffered by the plaintiff, and it is
true that the jury can consider the potential injury, harm, or dam-
age caused by the defendant.  But the conjunction of these two is,
at a minimum, highly misleading, and is almost certainly incor-
rect.  It seems self-evident that part of the reason for instructing
the jury on “reasonable relationship” is that under both BMW and
virtually every jurisdiction’s common law of excessiveness on
punitive damages, the ratio of punitive damages to compensatory
damages is a consideration in assessing the permissibility of the
award; “reasonable relationship” is a rough version of what courts
think about when they assess the ratio.  If that is so, however, then
potential harm should stay out of the picture for it is clearly not
what the higher courts—especially the Supreme Court—are
including in the ratio assessment.
91. 1 Ohio Jury Instructions 23.71 (2006) (2008 update).
One thing that can be said
in favor of all of these model
instructions is that they are
less confusing than that
which Philip Morris prof-
fered in Williams, which read
in part:  “The size of any pun-
ishment should bear a rea-
sonable relationship to the
harm caused to Jesse
Williams by the defendant’s
punishable misconduct.
Although you may consider the extent of harm suffered by
others in determining what that reasonable relationship is,
you are not to punish the defendant for the impact of its
alleged misconduct on other persons, who may bring law-
suits of their own in which other juries can resolve their
claims and award punitive damages for those harms, as such
other juries see fit.” 
While Justice Stevens was probably right to point out the
great (and perhaps elusive) nuance of the distinction between
punishing for harming others (which is impermissible, accord-
ing to the majority) and finding greater reprehensibility
because of harm to others (which is permissible), that distinc-
tion was not really the principal problem of Philip Morris’s
instruction.  The problem was that these issues were further
entangled by the concept of a “reasonable relationship”
between the punishment of Philip Morris and the harm to
Jesse Williams.  Presumably, Philip Morris was conceding that
the damages could be greater where there was greater repre-
hensibility but was trying to insist that the relationship to
actual harm (ratio) must remain reasonable.  However, that
message is itself quite complicated.  Merging that idea with the
subtle distinction noted by Justice Stevens was simply too con-
fusing.  All three of the model instructions quoted above avoid
that pitfall.  California’s even manages to do so while retaining
the concept of a “reasonable relationship,” prudently set forth
in a different portion of the instruction.
None of the instructions set out above is patently in conflict
with the Supreme Court’s decision in Williams; indeed, all
three are plainly designed to conform to Williams, and all three
do conform to what might be called “the letter of Williams.”
Whether they conform to the spirit of Williams is a question
that cannot really be answered without the imposition of a the-
oretical framework upon the quite sparse majority opinion.
From the perspective of the framework put forth in this article,
all three are vulnerable to criticism.   
The Eighth Circuit describes a very broad domain of conduct
that may be considered with regard to the reprehensibility of
the defendant’s conduct.  There is no limitation on where the
conduct took place.  Past and subsequent conduct is included.
It is permissible to include harm to others in considering rep-
rehensibility, but there is no effort by the Eighth Circuit to spec-
ify the reasons that this is relevant to reprehensibility.
California’s instruction is both better and worse on this
question.  It is (arguably) better because only conduct in
California is to be considered and because harm to others is
not specifically mentioned as relevant (which reduces confu-
sion).  It is worse, however, because the jury is told that they
are entitled to consider the question of whether there is a pat-
tern of conduct by defendant.  This suggests two quite con-
cerning points:  first, that the wrongs-to-others point is not
being used to ascertain the level of risk generated by the act
that injured plaintiff—Justice Breyer’s explanation of why it is
relevant to reprehensibility; second, that the wrongs-to-others
point is being used to invite the jury to punish the defendant
for a RICO-like “pattern of conduct” rather than for the par-
ticular act or acts that injured the plaintiff.  In short, it actually
looks more like an instruction directing the jury to punish in
the spirit of a “public sanction.”90
Of the three instructions offered here, Ohio’s is clearly the
closest to the theoretical model proposed in this article.  It also
appears to be the shortest, the clearest, and the most likely to
be digestible and helpful to juries:  Evidence of harm to others
cannot be the basis of extra punishment but can only be con-
sidered to help the jury decide whether the defendant “showed
a conscious disregard for the rights and safety of other persons
that had a great probability of causing substantial harm.”91 But
it, too, is not beyond reproach.  It does not mention risk itself
but only conscious disregard of risk; while the theoretical
model introduced here suggests this is a more defensible view,
the view is farther, not closer, to what the Court’s opinion actu-
ally says.  Relatedly, defense lawyers might argue from this
instruction that jurors should not be permitted to consider
injuries incurred by nonparties of which the defendant was not
aware (or could not have been aware) prior to the conduct that
injured the plaintiff; whether Ohio intended such a restrictive
approach (which this article would likely favor, but the Court
has not indicated) is unclear.  Moreover, the instruction does
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not indicate whether harm to others should be considered
where the plaintiff’s theory is that the defendant’s conduct was
intended to cause injury to the plaintiff; in such instances,
punitives would be available but evidence of conscious disre-
gard would seem irrelevant.
VI.  POST-WILLIAMS CASE LAW:  A CRITICAL
DISCUSSION
While hundreds of courts have cited to Williams, far fewer
courts have actually applied it, and fewer still have applied it
with any care.  This section reviews a (concededly unsystem-
atic) selection of published decisions that apply Williams, sub-
dividing the cases into the four topics that appear to be most
worthy of attention:  (1) whether the failure to provide a cau-
tionary instruction of the sort favored by the Williams Court
has generated a reversal, remand, or remittitur; (2) whether
waiver and forfeiture arguments based on failure to proffer an
adequate instruction will defeat a Williams-based appeal; (3)
how courts treat the relationship between nonparty harm and
reprehensibility; and (4) whether the Supreme Court’s analysis
of due process and punitive damages is perceived by lower
courts as a relatively minor or a relatively major development
for state punitive-damages law.
A. STRAIGHTFORWARD REVERSAL AND REMAND 
Bullock v. Philip Morris USA, Inc.92 represents the post-
Supreme Court victory that Philip Morris thought it should
obtain in Oregon.  As in the trial court in Williams, counsel for
Philip Morris drafted a proposed jury instruction that cau-
tioned the jury that it may not punish for harm to nonparties
but may punish for reprehensibility.  As in Williams, the trial
judge refused the instruction, and the jury came in with a very
large verdict.  Philip Morris took the Supreme Court’s Williams
opinion and used it to demand of the appellate court that the
jury verdict be vacated in light of an improper refusal to give
the proffered jury instruction, which seemed to track the prin-
ciples laid out by the Court.  Unlike the Supreme Court of
Oregon, however, the California Court of Appeals accepted
Philip Morris’s argument and vacated the jury verdict on the
ground that Philip Morris’s proposed cautionary instruction
ought to have been given.  The case was remanded for a new
trial on punitive damages.
Ford Motor Company similarly obtained a reversal and
remand from a panel of the Ninth Circuit in White v. Ford
Motor Company.93 In 1994, the plaintiffs’ three-year-old son
was playing in his father’s Ford pickup truck, which was
parked facing downhill in the family’s sloped driveway.  He
accidentally knocked the gearshift from first gear into neutral,
and the parking brake did not hold.  When the boy fell or
climbed out of the rolling truck, he fell underneath the truck,
which rolled over him and killed him.  Based on evidence
obtained during discovery documenting a known propensity
for the parking break of this
model to slip, leading to the
truck rolls that caused dam-
age, the Whites persuaded a
jury that Ford should have
recalled the truck or warned
consumers of this danger,
rather than consciously refus-
ing to do either.   
After a jury trial on liabil-
ity, compensatory and puni-
tive damages, a reversal and
remand (prior to Williams),
and a second jury trial on
punitive damages, the District
Court of Nevada generated a
compensatory-damages award of $2.3 million and a punitive-
damages award of $52 million.  In the second trial, the plain-
tiffs’ counsel told the jury that Ford was aware of 54 people
who had been injured by rollaways before 1999.    Ford
objected to the trial court’s jury instruction and “requested an
instruction that would prevent the jury from punishing it ‘in
this case not just for the harm to these plaintiffs, but for harm
to other plaintiffs, whether in state or out of state.’”94 The dis-
trict court refused to give the proposed instruction.  Because
of that refusal, the Ninth Circuit panel reversed and remanded
with a direction that “the district court must explain to the
jury that although evidence of harm to nonparties may bear
on Ford’s reprehensibility, any award of punitive damages can-
not be used to ‘punish [Ford] directly for harms to . . . non-
parties.’”95
Fourteen years after the loss of their son, the White’s are
still litigating this case against Ford; in that respect, the Ninth
Circuit’s decision to remand a second time might seem remark-
ably accommodating to Ford under the circumstances.
Nevertheless, the discussion in this article might also lead to
the conclusion that district court, and even the Ninth Circuit,
remained too accommodating to the plaintiffs in their treat-
ment of punitive damages even in this last round.  It is hard to
see why rollover injuries occurring after 1994 should be
deemed relevant to Ford’s reprehensibility for the purposes of
punitive damages, but the district court permitted just this and
the Ninth Circuit did not comment upon any problem.  Post-
Williams, defendants in Ford’s situation should object to such
inclusion.  They have nothing to do with the reprehensibility
of Ford’s wronging of the White child because they occurred
after his accident.
B.  WAIVED RIGHTS, FORFEITURE OF RIGHTS 
There are other straightforward decisions to reverse and
remand in light of refused jury instructions since Williams, but
not many (at least among those in published reporters).96 The
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97. In an unpublished opinion, the Tenth Circuit shows a striking
lack of concern for a defendant who wished the district court to
alter jury instructions based on Williams, which had been decided
after the briefing before the district court.  The defendant’s delay
of a few weeks in writing a letter to the district court regarding the
recently decided Williams played a role in the Tenth Circuit’s rul-
ing; so, too, did its perception that the ruling in Williams was suf-
ficiently telegraphed by State Farm to put the defendant on notice
that it should request nonparty-harm instructions.  Cook v.
Medical Savings Ins. Co., 287 Fed. App’x. 657, 2008 WL 2805472
(10th Cir. 2008).
98. Indeed, Ford rather dramatically lost an argument quite like
Williams in the California Supreme Court, in Johnson v. Ford
Motor Co., 113 P.3d 82  (Cal. 2005).  In Johnson, Ford was defend-
ing an argument made successfully at the Court of Appeal for the
5th District that a plaintiff may not justify a $10 million punitive-
damages award on a compensatory award of $17,811.60 by
depicting the scope and profitability of the defendant’s  fraudulent
conduct.   Johnson v. Ford Motor Co., 37 Cal. Rptr. 3d 283 (Ct.
App. 2005).  That decision, in turn, applied the reasoning of the
same appellate court in Romo v. Ford Motor Co., 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d
793 (Ct. App. 2003).  Romo expressly applied the theoretical
analysis of Thomas H. Colby’s article, Beyond the Multiple
Punishment Problem: Punitive Damages as Punishment for
Individual, Private Wrongs, 87 MINN. L. REV. 583 (2003) [Colby,
supra note 73].  To summarize:  the Court of Appeals for the 5th
District followed Colby on a nonparty-harm-type argument in
Romo; the 5th District applied its own rule in Johnson; the
California Supreme Court reversed the 5th District, indicating it
was not persuaded by Colby or by the idea that the U.S. Supreme
Court would adopt a nonparty harm-rule.  
Similarly, as State Farm indicates, large insurance companies
have also played a significant role in pushing this issue at appel-
late courts; Merrick v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co. is also an unsur-
prising case in which the defendant proposed a nonparty-harm
jury instruction.
99. 73 Cal. Rptr. 3d 277 (Ct. App. 2008).
100. Buell-Wilson, 73 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 324 (quoting Ford’s proposed
Special Jury Instruction No. 21).
101. Id. at 326.
102. Id. at 326-27.
103. Buell-Wilson v. Ford Motor Co., 187 P.3d 887 (Cal. 2008) (grant-
ing review but deferring briefing pending the decision of the
United States Supreme Court in pending Williams petition),
review dismissed, case remanded, 207 P.3d 1 (2009).
104. 500 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2007).
obvious reason for this is
that cases that went to a jury
before Williams would rarely
have featured a defendant
who proposed such an
instruction at trial.97 It is no
surprise that Philip Morris
did so in Bullock, and only
slightly more surprising that
Ford did so; Philip Morris
and Ford have been on the
cutting edge of the develop-
ment of constitutional puni-
tive-damages law at the
appellate courts.98
Where the defendant did not propose nonparty-harm jury
instructions of the right sort, plaintiffs will argue that the right
to such an instruction was waived.  Indeed, even where the
defendant did propose such instructions, plaintiffs are likely to
argue (as they did on remand in Williams), that the instruc-
tions proposed were not quite right and that the trial court’s
rejection of them does not warrant remand.  That is exactly the
argument plaintiff Buell-Wilson made against Ford at the
California Court of Appeal last year, and the Court of Appeal
accepted the plaintiff’s argument.  Thus, in Buell-Wilson v. Ford
Motor Co.,99 the appellate court expressed its approval of the
trial judge’s rejection of Ford’s proposed Special Jury
Instruction No. 21: 
In determining the appropriate amount of punitive
damages, if any, in this case, you may consider only the
harm to the plaintiffs.  Any individuals other than the
plaintiffs who might claim to have been harmed by
Ford have the right to bring their own lawsuit seeking
damages for any alleged injuries they may have
incurred.  Therefore, if you decide to award any puni-
tive damages, your award must be limited to redressing
the injuries incurred only by the plaintiffs in this law-
suit.100
The trial judge was right to reject this instruction, accord-
ing to the appellate court, because the instruction “did not
merely tell the jury it could not impose punishment for harm
suffered by third parties.  Rather, it told the jury it could not
consider third party harm for any purpose, including in assess-
ing the reprehensibility of Ford’s conduct.”101 The instruction
ran afoul of Williams; indeed, its impermissibility was evident
from the Supreme Court’s prior decision in State Farm.
Moreover, it contradicted the trial court’s other instructions,
which indicated that the jury should consider how reprehensi-
ble the defendant’s conduct was.  In what can be read as a
rather harsh comment on what it regarded as overreaching by
Ford at trial, the appellate court concluded:  “Thus, by propos-
ing an instruction that was an incorrect and misleading state-
ment of law, Ford has forfeited the right to assert instructional
error before this court.”102 The California Supreme Court
recently dismissed the petition for review and remanded back
to the intermediate appellate court. 103
The defendant Paul Revere Life Insurance Company over-
came a similar forfeiture/waiver argument before the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit when it sought a
Williams-based remand in Merrick v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co.
The case concerned a large insurance company’s alleged bad-
faith denial of a plaintiff ’s disability insurance claim.104
Although the $10 million punitive-damages award on top of
plaintiff’s $1.65 million compensatory-damages award was not
strikingly large, it is nonetheless initially surprising that a
Williams vacate-and-remand order was hard to procure.  The
plaintiff’s counsel in Merrick plainly made the whole case
revolve around Paul Revere’s alleged large-scale scheme to deal
unfairly and in bad faith with claimants and insureds.
Moreover, Paul Revere proposed a nonparty-harm jury instruc-
The Ninth Circuit 
had no trouble 
concluding that 
there was a real 
risk in this case that
the jury punished 
the defendants 
for the harm 
they caused to 
nonparties.
105. Id. at 1015.  The proposed instruction was:  “In deciding
whether or in what amount to award punitive damages, you
may consider only the specific conduct by Defendant that
injured Plaintiff.  You may not punish Defendants for conduct
or practices that did not affect Plaintiff, even if you believe that
such conduct or practices were wrongful or deserving of pun-
ishment.   The law provides other means to punish wrongdoing
unrelated to Plaintiff.”
106. Id. at 1017.
107. Id. (citing Ragsdell v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 688 F.2d 1281, 1285
(9th Cir. 1982) (emphasis in original).
108. Id. at 1017-18.
109. 261 S.W.3d 583 (Mo. App. 2008). 
110. 509 F. Supp. 2d 219 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).
111. 569 F. Supp. 2d 841 (N.D. Iowa 2008).
112. Rinehart, 261 S.W.3d at 597-98 (quoting Williams, 549 U.S. at
357).
113. Kauffman, 509 F. Supp. 2d at 214.
114. 569 F. Supp. 2d at 852-53.
115. See Part II.A., supra.
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tion, which the district court rejected.105 The Ninth Circuit
had no trouble concluding that there was a real risk in this case
that the jury punished the defendants for the harm they caused
to nonparties.  And the court correctly noted that the defen-
dant had made a timely request for a jury instruction to guard
against such a risk.  However, the court also credited the plain-
tiff’s argument that the proposed jury instruction was mislead-
ing because it did not indicate that harm to others may enter
the reprehensibility analysis.106 This meant that the plaintiff
had a reasonably good argument that the district court judge
was right to reject the proposed jury instruction.  Nevertheless,
the Ninth Circuit ruled for defendant, reasoning that “where a
proposed instruction is supported by law and not adequately
covered by other instructions, the court should give a non-mis-
leading instruction that captures the substance of the proposed
instruction.”107 The court concluded that the failure to give a
nonparty-harm instruction was therefore error, and remanded
for a new trial on punitive damages.108
More straightforward discussions of waiver are found in
Rinehart v. Shelter General Ins. Co.,109 Kauffman v. Maxim
Healthcare Servs. Inc.,110and American Family Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Miell.111 After noting that Philip Morris had requested a pro-
tective jury instruction in the trial court in Williams and that
the Supreme Court specifically indicated that a trial court must
offer such protection “on request,”112 the Rinehart court
inferred that the defendant’s failure to request such an instruc-
tion at trial waived the right to raise the failure to give such an
instruction on appeal; virtually the same analysis is articulated
by the district court in Kauffman, an employment-discrimina-
tion case.113 The district judge in Miell noted that although
the trial was held after Williams was decided, and although
Iowa Uniform Jury Instructions had already been amended to
reflect Williams, the jury was not instructed that it could con-
sider defendant’s prior similar conduct or that it could not
punish defendant for harm caused to others.  The district court
ruled, however, that the defendant waived the right to have
such an instruction because the defendant failed to request it.
Although Fed. R. Civ. P. 51(d)(2) sometimes permits a court to
consider plain error notwithstanding a party’s failure to raise
the issue, it does so only when the error affects substantial
rights.  The court rejected this argument because it determined
that any mention of nonparty harm would have had little or no
impact on the outcome.114
Merrick and Miell are together quite illuminating but also
create another puzzle about the path of Williams.  They are illu-
minating because they indicate that whether the defendant’s
proposal of a protective jury
instruction was exactly cor-
rect is not necessarily the
beginning and end of
whether the punitive dam-
ages award should be
vacated under Williams for
lack of a protective jury
instruction.  Merrick rea-
soned that a defendant’s
proffer of a flawed instruc-
tion that captures an essen-
tial protection triggers an
obligation in the court to craft an acceptable instruction cap-
turing that protection; Miell reasoned that a defendant’s failure
to request a jury instruction will not relieve the court of an
obligation to provide such an instruction if the protection is
properly viewed as guarding substantial rights in the case before
the court, but it concluded that the defendant had not met that
standard or anything like it.  What now appears odd, however,
is the Oregon Supreme Court’s narrow focus in Williams (on
second remand) on the question of whether Philip Morris’s
instruction was perfectly correct under Oregon law.  As the dis-
cussion in Part II of this article indicates,115 the majority opin-
ion in Williams contains several holdings about the procedural
due-process protection a defendant is entitled to with regard to
punishment for nonparty harm; the right to a jury instruction
when proposed is only the most specific of the holdings.  
C.  REPREHENSIBILITY
Justice Stevens and the academic critiques of the majority
suggest that the greatest problems in applying Williams might
involve reprehensibility.116 Several cases bear out that predic-
tion.  An unusual (and quite disturbing) example is Snyder v.
Phelps,117 from the United States District Court in the District
of Maryland.  The litigation stems from a funeral at a Catholic
church in the town of Westminster, Maryland, held for
Matthew A. Snyder, the son of plaintiff Albert Snyder.  Raised
in Westminster, Matthew Snyder served as a Marine Lance
Corporal in Iraq, where he was killed in the line of duty.
Snyder was gay, which is what caught the attention of the
defendants:  Fred W. Phelps, his daughters Shirley Phelps-
Roper, Rebekah Phelps-Davis, and Westboro Baptist Church,
Inc. of Topeka, Kansas, which Phelps founded.  Phelps and his
church are anti-gay activists.118 The defendants traveled from
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in order to picket Snyder’s
funeral.  In Westminster, at
the actual funeral and
funeral procession, they
carried signs featuring mes-
sages such as:  “God Hates
the USA,” “America is
doomed,” “Pope in hell,”
“Fag troops,” “You’re going
to hell,” “God hates you,”
“Semper fi fags,” and “Thank God for dead soldiers.”  Even
after the funeral, the activities continued; Rebekah Phelps-
Roper created an entire documentary (which she placed on the
church’s website, www.godhatesfags.com) critically depicting
Snyder and his parents. 
Albert Snyder sued the four defendants on several theories
and obtained a verdict of $10.9 million on intentional inflic-
tion emotional distress and intrusion-upon-seclusion claims
(linked via civil conspiracy).  Of that, $2.9 million was com-
pensatory damages (compensating him predominantly for the
severe emotional harm he incurred and continues to incur),
and $8 million in punitive damages ($2 million for each defen-
dant).  In its motion for new trial or remittitur, the defendants
argued that the award should be reduced both under BMW and
under Williams.  It appears that the defendants had engaged in
such demonstrations at gay soldiers’ funerals before Snyder’s
and that they intended to continue doing so.  The defendants’
intention to continue doing so was brought to the jury’s atten-
tion; the plaintiff’s lawyer, in arguing for a punitive-damages
award, told the jury that its award should say “don’t do this in
Maryland again. Do not bring your circus of hate to Maryland
again.  That no son or daughter of Maryland shall have [his or
her] funeral defiled by the malicious tactics of the [D]efen-
dants again and that no future father or mother suffers this.”119
The district judge rejected defendants’ Williams challenge, rea-
soning that “[p]laintiff’s counsel did not mention past harm to
third parties, only future harm to third parties.”  Nonetheless,
the $8 million verdict was reduced to $2.1 million on state-law
grounds principally concerning the inability of the defendants
to pay.120
The district judge in Snyder is plainly correct in stating that
Williams addresses the unconstitutionality of punishing for
prior harm to nonparties rather than deterring future acts
toward nonparties, and to that extent, the judge’s holding is
beyond reproach.    However, it does not take much imagina-
tion to generate the following concern:  if the punitive-dam-
ages award is functioning as a deterrent for future conduct, is
it not functioning as a public sanction, rather than private
redress?  And if that is so, then the constitutional safeguards
appropriate to public sanctions should be applied, and the
damages award should have been vacated under the interpre-
tation of Williams constructed in this article.
The foregoing anticipated objection is understandable, but
it misconceives the peculiar role that punitive damages held
under the common-law conception.  Variously called “vindic-
tive damages,” “punitive damages,” “exemplary damages,” and
“smart money,” the common law simultaneously embraced two
ideas: one concerning what grounds justify a plaintiff’s entitlement
to a punitive-damages award and another concerning what worth-
while social functions might be served if punitive damages were
awarded.   Plainly, the courts conceived the entitlement as
grounded in an individual victim’s right to redress the wrong
done to him or her by the wrongdoer.  But that did not pre-
clude the damages serving some sort of social function too; it
is just that the social function was not needed to provide an
adequate ground for imposing the damages.  It is therefore a
mistake to infer from the fact that it serves a deterrent role—
or even that the jurors paid attention to its possible deterrent
role when thinking of what damages to award—that the
ground of entitlement to have the award imposed was precisely
its future deterrent role.  So long as the award could be under-
stood as something that the private plaintiff was entitled to
exact by virtue of the scope of his right to redress this wrong,
the fact that jurors used deterrent considerations to select a
higher sanction from within this legitimate range does not
mean that the award ought to be classified as a public sanction.  
The real question regarding reprehensibility in Snyder was
actually never asked.  It is whether, in light of how the jury was
instructed and in light of the evidence supplied to the jury, it
was plausible to understand the jury’s decision to impose $2
million dollars of punitive damages on each of these defen-
dants as a decision that Mr. Snyder was entitled to exact such
damages in light of the reprehensibility of the wrong they did
to him, or whether one would have to understand the jury as
having made this decision in connection with the reprehensi-
bility of their whole political agenda and pattern of conduct.  I
think it is entirely plausible that the jury arrived at this deci-
sion simply focusing on the wrong done to Mr. Snyder; to the
extent that is so, the district court’s decision is not only con-
sistent with Williams but is also consistent with the broader
account of the constitutional analysis of punitive damages
offered here.
A far broader conception of reprehensibility is embraced by
the Eleventh Circuit in Action Marine Inc. v. Continental Carbon
Inc.,121 in which a manufacturer of black carbon was held liable
to the owners of property that was polluted, discolored, and
devalued by emissions from the manufacturer’s plant.  The
legal theories asserted were negligence, wanton conduct,
119. Id. at 592.
120. Id.  The court also rejected the BMW challenge to the size of the
award as well as all other grounds for the defendants’ motions for
judgment as a matter of law, j.n.o.v., new trial, and relief from
judgment.   However, the court granted in part the defendants’
motions for remittitur to $2.1 million under Maryland common-
law principles regarding punitive damages.  More particularly,
under Bowden v. Caldor Inc., 710 A.2d 267 (Md. 1998), the court
decided that the duplicativeness of the two causes of action and
the limited ability of defendants to pay the punitive damages
awards justified a reduction of Westboro to $1 million, Fred
Phelps to $300,000, Rebekah Phelps-Davis to $200,000, and
Shirley Phelps-Roper (who authored the documentary) to
$600,000.   
121. 481 F.3d 1302 (11th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, Continental Carbon,
Inc. v. Action Marine, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2994 (2008).
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breach of duty to warn, fraud, misrepresentation, deceit, nui-
sance, trespass, and strict liability.  After a ten-day trial, an
Alabama jury returned a verdict of approximately $1.2 million
in compensatory damages, $1.3 million in attorney fees, and
$17.5 million in punitive damages.   
In its evaluation of the defendant’s appeal, the Eleventh
Circuit considered Williams’s holding that punitive damages
may not be used to punish nonparties, but the risk of harm to
others may be part of the reprehensibility analysis.  It reasoned
that because “Continental’s actions likely harmed a great num-
ber of people and businesses who are not parties to this litiga-
tion,”122 Continental’s actions and inaction were “exceedingly
reprehensible.”123 A similar approach is taken by a Louisiana
appellate court in Grefer v. Alpha Technical;124 the damage to
nonparties done by the defendant Exxon’s polluting behavior
is said to warrant a very high finding of reprehensibility, which
in turn justifies a higher punitive-damages award.  
On the theoretical model offered here, those courts’ inter-
pretation of Williams—while consistent enough with the terse
language of Justice Breyer’s opinion—is not consistent with a
theoretically sound understanding of the rationale for the non-
party-harm rule.   In both Action Marine and Grefer, there were
sustained accounts of the defendants’ awareness of the harm
they were doing to the plaintiffs and therefore of the reckless-
ness or indifference of the defendants harming the plaintiffs.
That other victims were similarly situated and also endured
harm from these wrongful activities does not in any way alter
the characterization of the nature of the wrong to the plaintiffs
in those cases.  In other words, harm to nonparties was not
probative of the reprehensibility of the defendants’ injuring of
the plaintiffs.  Reprehensibility was purely a back door for
punitive damages operating as a public sanction for the wrong-
ful conduct.  The evidence of harm to nonparties, in these
cases, was such that the jury should have been cautioned not
to consider it in evaluating the reprehensibility of the defen-
dant for purposes of imposing punitive damages.  To the extent
that motions for remittitur invited the courts in these cases to
reduce the punitive-damages award commensurate with their
sense of how the impermissible considerations might have
inflated the award, the courts should have done so. 
D.  LARGER QUESTIONS ABOUT THE
CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF PUNITIVE
DAMAGES
In its litigation before the United States Supreme Court and
the Oregon Supreme Court, Philip Morris has focused upon
the trial judge’s refusal to instruct the jury in what Philip
Morris alleges was the constitutionally required manner.  The
record in Williams produces several other issues that revolve
around the same idea:  (1) was there evidence admitted that
should not have been because irrelevant or prejudicial; (2)
were there statements made during witness questioning or
during opening or closing
statements that should not
have been made; (3) were
there motions in limine that
ought to have been granted;
and (4) was the award
excessive in light of the evi-
dence that could properly
have been considered?  As
several of the cases consid-
ered above indicate, defen-
dants in the lower courts
have already begun asserting
many of these arguments,
and lower courts—quite appropriately—have taken them seri-
ously as offshoots of Williams.
There are, however, much larger questions about punitive-
damages law that Williams may force lower courts to confront.
These questions revolve around the disquieting possibility that
the United States Supreme Court in Williams was expressing its
disapproval of a whole way of thinking about punitive dam-
ages that is in fact very popular in state tort law.  I have sug-
gested that Williams can be understood as containing a litmus
test for when punitive damages are functioning as a public
sanction for antisocial or harmful conduct that the state wishes
to punish.  When the litmus test is positive, then punitive
damages are not plausibly viewed as functioning wholly within
the private-redress model.  They therefore require the greater
due-process protection that tort cases traditionally have had.
Or so the argument went.
The problem with this view is that many states—perhaps
most—openly regard punitive damages as a public sanction for
socially harmful and wrongful conduct.    Many articulate this
approach quite explicitly; many have adopted clear-and-con-
vincing evidence standards, split-recovery statutes, and nonin-
surability of punitive-damages awards for this very reason.  If
Williams is so understood, does that not suggest that such
states’ punitive-damages law is categorically unconstitutional?
Some courts have begun to worry about this possibility.
Thus, a federal judge in the District of Colorado read the
defendant’s argument as “inviting” the court to hold a
Colorado statute governing punitive damages “unconstitu-
tional,” an invitation the court declined.125 Similarly, the Chief
Judge in the Western District of Oklahoma in a pair of
thoughtful post-Williams opinions voiced her concerns that
Oklahoma’s punitive-damages statute is “ripe” for judicial
review because “[o]n its face, [the statute] contemplates harm
to third parties as the foundation for any award of punitive
damages.”126
While these two courts may well have been exaggerating,
the general concern is entirely sensible.  States that funnel
punitive-damages awards to the state revenue do not generally
122. Id. at 1320.
123. Id. 
124. 965 So. 2d 511 (La. Ct. App. 2007), cert. denied, Exxon Mobil
Corp. v. Grefer, 128 S. Ct. 2054 (2008). 
125. Cook v. Rockwell International Corp., 564 F. Supp. 2d 1189,
1212 (D. Colo. 2008).
126. Huggins v. Four Seasons Nursing Centers, Inc., 2007 WL
3113429 (N.D. Okla. 2007) (citing Moody v. Ford Motor Co.,
506 F. Supp. 2d 823, 848 (N.D. Okla. 2007)).
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127. See, e.g., Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Conkle, 436 S.E.2d 635 (Ga. 1993)
(rejecting plaintiff ’s taking claim based on split-recovery
statute); but see Kirk v. Denver Pub Co., 818 P.2d 262 (Colo.
1991) (accepting plaintiff’s takings claim).   
regard themselves as doing a taking of the plaintiff’s prop-
erty.127 They regard the state as being at least equally entitled,
or more entitled, to the proceeds of the punitive-damages
awards.  This very idea appears to undercut the hypothesis that
punitive damages are awarded as an expanded version of what
the plaintiff is entitled to receive as a matter of private redress.
It appears to concede that the punitive damages award is func-
tioning as a public sanction.  If so, then the procedural due-
process analysis urged here arguably carries over to every
instance in which a court applies a split-recovery statute with-
out affording to the plaintiff a process far less vague in its stan-
dard than that which the private law of torts typically provides.
And split-recovery statutes are simply one example.  Although
we are not currently seeing these broad critical arguments from
defendants, we should expect to see more of this in coming
years unless the federal courts decide to take Williams in a par-
ticularly narrow direction; in the terms of this article, if they
adhere to purely contextual, rather than facial, public-sanction
detection tests.  Whether the Supreme Court or circuit courts
would actually embrace such broad elaborations of constitu-
tional punitive-damages doctrine is, of course, simply a matter
of conjecture at this stage.
CONCLUSION
Philip Morris USA v. Williams should be seen for what it is:
the Roberts Court’s first foray into the constitutional status of
punitive damages.  It marks a shift from the sort of excessive-
ness review that sometimes goes under the label of “substantive
due process” to a nuanced but potentially quite aggressive form
of “procedural due-process” review that looks less at the size of
the award and more at the process used to reach it.    As with
many procedural decisions, Williams is easy to discount as tech-
nical and relatively unimportant.  This would be a mistake.
Both in its content and in what it foreshadows about possible
directions for the constitutional scrutiny of punitive damages,
Williams is hugely important.  Although declining to exercise
its power to vacate or remit the award against Philip Morris, the
Court did something potentially more significant:  it began to
question whether states can use punitive damages as an instru-
ment of public law to sanction wrongdoers given the relatively
meager procedural protection defendants have to defend them-
selves when such “public wrong” arguments are thrown at them
in front of a jury in an individual tort case.  Thus far, Williams
has generated only modest changes in jury instructions and a
surprisingly narrow array of appeals and motions to remit by
defendants who have met with mixed success.  One should not
be surprised, however, if defendants start to see Williams as a
blueprint for bold critiques of state punitive-damages law.
The dissenting Justices in Williams—Justices Stevens,
Scalia, Thomas, and Ginsburg—were understandably resistant
to the arguments of Philip Morris and the majority because the
nonparty-harm rule adopted by the Court is difficult to recon-
cile with the prominence of reprehensibility in punitive-dam-
ages law.  Moreover, there is a substantial potentiality for intru-
siveness of a sort inimical to federalist values.   Nevertheless,
this article has taken a more optimistic and constructive
approach to the Court’s opinion in Williams, one which aims to
guide future courts both in recognizing the constitutional jus-
tification at the basis of the decision and in applying the stan-
dards set forth in a cogent manner.
The essential holding of Williams is that while a punitive-
damages award aimed at punishing the defendant for injuring
a party may be constitutionally permissible, a punitive-dam-
ages award aimed at punishing the defendant for injuring non-
parties is a violation of the Due Process Clause.  The basic
principle here, according to this article, is quite clear:  punitive
damages are operating as part of the traditional common law of
torts when the plaintiff is seeking to redress the defendant’s
injuring of her but that cannot be what is happening when the
state is punishing the defendant for injuring nonparties.  To
the extent that the punitive damages award is punishing the
defendant for injuring nonparties, it is serving as a form of
public sanction, not simply as a form of private redress that can
deliver some of the same deterrent effect as a public sanction.
If this is so, then the process applicable to public sanctions—
criminal at most and regulatory at least—must come into play.
State tort law typically lacks such process, and therefore the
punitive-damages awards are unconstitutional on this devel-
oped version of the principles underlying Williams.  The non-
party-harm rule of Williams can thus be understood as a litmus
test for when the punitive-damages award is operating as a
public sanction; for awards that show up positive on the litmus
test, there is a procedural due-process problem inherent in the
vague standards of state tort law.
It remains to be seen how far the United States Supreme
Court would really be willing to push this line of thinking.
Meanwhile, however, a variety of medium-sized analytical
problems will face courts operating under Williams.  How to
conceive of reprehensibility, how to instruct a jury, when to
permit evidence of nonparty harm (and for what purposes) —
these are some of the many questions with which lower courts
have already begun to grapple.  The nonparty-harm rule ana-
lyzed as a public-sanction detection test permits us to begin to
answer those questions.
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